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1  | INTRODUC TION
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 and European Debt crisis since 2010 have revived the discussion of the 
suitability of the EMU as a common currency area. Business cycle synchronization is considered a pre‐requisite 
for a well‐functioning common currency area, according to the Optimum Currency Area theory (Alesina & Barro, 
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Abstract
We provide new evidence on the effects of fiscal policy and 
government size on pairwise business cycle synchronization 
in EMU. A novel time‐varying framework is employed to es‐
timate business cycle synchronization and subsequently a 
panel approach is used to establish the role of fiscal vari‐
ables in determining the pairwise synchronization observa‐
tions across time. The findings suggest similarities in the size 
of the public sector, yet divergence in fiscal policy stance, 
matter for the determination of business cycle synchroniza‐
tion. Hence, increased fiscal federalism in EMU will contrib‐
ute to increased business cycle synchronization. Our results 
remain robust to different specifications and sub‐periods.
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2002). Kappler and Sachs (2013) maintain that without a certain level of synchronicity “a common monetary policy 
may not satisfy the needs of all member countries and may even contribute to cyclical divergence” (p. 1).
Hence, the level of synchronization is a matter of importance to policymakers, particularly in a common cur‐
rency zone. Moreover, business cycle synchronization enables a more effective coordination of fiscal and mon‐
etary policies (Mundell, 1961). Business cycle synchronization may also impact upon the long run viability of 
monetary union, particularly in the presence of ‘decoupling’ of business cycles, such as in the EMU, where de‐
coupling between the periphery countries relative to the core EU countries is observed in the post‐financial crisis 
period (Ahmed et al., 2018; Degiannakis, Duffy, & Filis, 2014).
A vast amount of research has focused on business cycle synchronization and its determinants. Belke, Domnick, 
and Gros (2017) provide an extensive review of the literature, along with the earlier research by Degiannakis et al. 
(2014), Papageorgiou, Michaelides, and Milios (2010), de Haan, Inklaar, and Jong‐A‐Pin (2008) and Altavilla (2004). 
The aim of the present study is not to present a thorough account of the existing findings, but rather to identify 
relevant gaps in the literature so to highlight the contribution made. In short, the literature related to the determi‐
nants of business cycle synchronization focuses mainly on bilateral trade, industrial specialization, monetary and 
financial integration, distance between countries, political ideology and global economic shocks.1
Nevertheless, according to Kappler and Sachs (2013, p. 1), business cycle synchronization is determined by 
“the degree of symmetry between macroeconomic shocks, transmission channels and institutional features (in‐
cluding fiscal policy), as well as, the level of economic integration” between countries. This claim is rather import‐
ant as the fact that the level of synchronization might be impacted by fiscal policy decisions and other institutional 
features, has been rather neglected by the literature. There are only a handful of studies focusing on the poten‐
tial impact of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronization (see, for instance, Gächter, Gruber, & Riedl, 2017; 
Inklaar, Jong‐A‐Pin, & Haan, 2008). Interestingly, there is no consensus among this limited number of studies as to 
whether fiscal policy can increase business cycle synchronization.
Overall, the current strand in this line of research has neglected several important aspects when considering the 
impact of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronization. First, unlike in the present research, previous studies have 
not considered the size of the government sector (by means of government expenditure) along with discretionary fiscal 
policy (proxied by the cyclically adjusted net lending) in order to explain business cycle synchronization, with the only 
exception being the study by Camacho, Perez‐Quiros, and Saiz (2006). This is rather important as understanding the 
role of fiscal policy and government size will help shape policy design and implementation to support monetary union.
Second, we do not assume an EU‐wide business cycle to estimate the level of synchronization between an EU 
aggregate business cycle and the individual countries’ business cycles. Rather, we consider bilateral synchronization 
levels across country‐pairs, in a similar fashion to Gächter et al. (2017) and Darvas et al. (2005). This approach over‐
comes the need to assume that a specific country acts as an “attractor” or that there is a force which drives a common 
business cycle. It also means that we do not assume the existence of any common European or world business cycle.
Third, unlike Gächter et al. (2017) and Darvas et al. (2005), we employ a robust time‐varying framework to 
estimate the pairwise business cycle synchronization, which overcomes issues related to the use of rolling‐win‐
dow correlations. For instance, results based on rolling‐window approaches are influenced by the choice of the 
window length, whereas no such decision is required using the time‐varying framework that we apply in this 
study. Even more, rolling‐window correlation exhibits slow dynamics due its overlapping calculation (i.e. when one 
observation is dropped at the start of the window length, it is subsequently replaced by another observation at 
the end of this window period.). This latter point is also responsible for the observed autocorrelation between the 
rolling‐window correlation figures at successive time points.
1 See, inter alia, Montinari and Stracca, (2016); Kappler and Sachs (2013); Cerqueira and Martins, (2009, 2011, (2009, 2011); Kose et al., (2008); 
Inklaar et al., (2008); de Haan et al., (2008); Calderon et al., (2007); Kose and Yi, (2006); Imbs, (2006); Camacho et al., (2006); Böwer and 
Guillemineau, (2006); Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005); Imbs, (2004); Morgan et al., (2004); Kose et al., (2003a, (2003b); Kalemli‐Ozcan et al., (2001); 
Frankel and Rose, (1998); Krugman, (1993); Canova and Dellas, (1993).
     |  3BUNYAN et Al.
Fourth, given that Degiannakis, Duffy, Filis, and Livada (2016) show the fiscal policy effects on business cycle 
synchronization are time varying, we also consider several sub‐periods in our analysis. Changes in the determi‐
nants of business cycle synchronization during different phases of European integration can help in understanding 
why countries may have synchronous or asynchronous business cycles.2
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we investigate both the role of fiscal policy 
and government size on business cycle synchronization across bilateral country‐pairs. Second, the co‐movement 
of business cycles across country‐pairs is calculated using a time‐varying approach. A time‐varying measure of 
business cycle synchronization is essential to capture the substantial changes in business cycle synchronization 
that occur over time, as discussed by Degiannakis et al. (2014), Degiannakis et al. (2016). Third, a broad range of 
explanatory variables are used, including, bilateral trade, sectorial specialization, the size of the government, fiscal 
policy, inflation and savings rates. The choice of these variables is informed by theoretical expectations, previous 
studies and data availability, in an attempt to capture as many potential determinants, to yield, as much as possible, 
unbiased and meaningful results. Finally, we examine the determinants of business cycle synchronization over 
different time periods, which are characterized by important institutional changes, in order to evaluate potential 
differences in the determinants of business cycle synchronization as these institutions change.
The main findings of the study show that both the fiscal policy variables matter for country‐pair business 
cycle synchronization in the EU. In particular, we show that countries with similarly sized public sectors, and 
fiscal divergence, have more synchronized business cycles. With respect to the control variables, we find that 
trade intensity, inflation differentials and differences in capital productivity growth rates matter for synchroniza‐
tion. Country‐pairs that trade more intensely and have similar productivity growth rates have more synchronized 
business cycles, while differences in inflation rates (i.e. higher inflation differentials) across country‐pairs lead 
to increased business cycle synchronization. Importantly, the evidence suggests that the set of determinants of 
synchronization does differ during different sub‐periods (e.g. Great Recession and the subsequent European Debt 
Crisis). These findings are useful for policy design with an aim to promote the synchronization of business cycles 
for the efficient operation of EMU.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the channels by which fiscal policy 
might impact business cycle synchronization. Section 3 provides a description of the data and the methodological 
approach. Section 4 analyses business cycle synchronization in the EU, whereas Section 5 analyses the empirical 
findings on the effects of fiscal policy on the level of business cycle synchronization. Finally, Section 6 concludes 
the study and presents the policy implications.
2  | TR ANSMISSION CHANNEL S FOR THE EFFEC TS OF FISC AL POLICY 
ON BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONIZ ATION
Ideas regarding the role of fiscal policy are never far from the centre of economic and policy debate. In the EU, 
the debate has revolved around the role of national fiscal policies, fiscal federalism and fiscal constraints, with 
issues regarding fiscal austerity to the fore most recently. The arguments have centred around the effectiveness 
and use of fiscal policy in smoothing business cycle fluctuations as well as issues associated with the role and 
scope of government activities. Moreover, in a monetary union, countries that face asymmetric shocks, or react 
2 It is noted that a synchronisation measure does not indicate whether cycles are synchronised due to the impact of common shocks or due to the 
transmission of idiosyncratic shocks from one country to another. There is a strand of the literature that specifically looks at the transmission of 
economic shocks rather than synchronisation, see Montinari and Stracca (2016) for example. By contrast, this current paper is in the tradition of 
papers investigating the determinants of business cycle synchronisation. We should also highlight that business cycle synchronisation does not 
necessarily mean economic convergence. Synchronisation in business cycles may exist; however, the cycles could exhibit different amplitudes due 
to non‐convergence. Synchronisation refers to the co‐movements of countries’ growth rates over time, whereas convergence is associated with the 
catch‐up effect between countries’ growth rates (Crowley and Schultz, 2010). We should also note that if synchronisation exists, it can lead to 
economic convergence.
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asymmetrically to common shocks, require fiscal authorities to use their fiscal policy to counterbalance the nega‐
tive impacts of the common monetary policy in promotion of stability and synchronization. This paper seeks to 
fill a gap in the literature and establish empirically the joint role of discretionary fiscal policy and the size of the 
government as determinants of business cycle synchronization.
The role of discretionary fiscal policy on the business cycle is ambiguous. The ambiguity arises due to the 
potential for discretionary fiscal policy to impact either as a source of economic shock (Fatás & Mihov 2006), or 
as a discretionary countercyclical stabilization tool used in a Keynesian manner. Moreover, when considering the 
impact of fiscal policy on the level of synchronization across countries, differences in fiscal policy stance across 
countries may be due to a stabilizing reaction to idiosyncratic shocks, or a stabilizing reaction to a common shock 
with idiosyncratic impact.
As such fiscal deficits may be used to smooth cyclical fluctuations and differences in fiscal deficits across 
countries may contribute to cyclical synchronization in responding to economic shocks. However, budget deficits 
which contribute to destabilizing the business cycle, due, for example, to procyclical fiscal policy, may contribute 
to reducing synchronization across countries due to the idiosyncratic nature of such fiscal shocks. It is an empirical 
question as to the impact of fiscal differences across countries on business cycle synchronization. Gächter et al. 
(2017), Gächter and Riedl (2014), Inklaar et al. (2008) and Darvas et al. (2005), for example, maintain that fiscal 
convergence may lead to higher synchronization, whereas Furceri and Karras (2008) suggest that fiscal policy 
does not really explain the synchronization of business cycles at all. In contrast, Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) 
find that fiscal policy differentials have driven differences between countries’ business cycles only prior to the 
establishment of the Stability and Growth Pact. However, Degiannakis et al. (2016) show that the effects of fiscal 
policy on business cycle synchronization are time‐varying, and they are not always used to promote greater syn‐
chronization levels. These studies mainly use either the budget balance or the cyclically adjusted budget deficits 
to approximate national fiscal policies.
The size of the government can have an impact on how fiscal policy is conducted and the impact it has on the 
business cycle. Despite the impact of the size of the government sector on output volatility, there is little research 
on the role of the size of the government sector on business cycle synchronization, see for example Camacho et 
al. (2006) for an empirical approach.
In considering the size of the government sector in the economy, there are two channels through which gov‐
ernment size may impact upon output volatility, that is the stabilization channel and the structural channel. Fatas 
and Mihov (2001) and Gali (1994) provide evidence of a strong negative correlation between government size 
and the volatility of GDP. The channel for this stabilization effect is that government size is associated with the 
size of automatic stabilizers. The automatic stabilizer component of government expenditure will operate in a 
direction counter to the business cycle. This counter cyclical element of public expenditure will dampen cyclical 
fluctuations. Hence, smaller government sectors, and smaller automatic stabilizers, react less to economic shocks.
Government sector size also determines the structure of the economy in terms of the mix of activity between 
the public and private sectors. Rodrik (1998) characterizes the government as a ‘safe’ sector, playing a risk reducing 
role, by reducing the volatility of output, particularly in more open economies. This safety characteristic of the 
public sector is confirmed by the results in Montinari and Stracca (2016), who show that countries with smaller 
public sectors are more vulnerable to spillover effects from foreign business cycles. By its nature, the government 
sector is not directly susceptible to the processes which drive the business cycle in the consumption, investment 
and international sectors of the private economy. Rather, the variation in the size of the government, both across 
countries and across time, is reflective of changing policies regarding the role and scope of the government in the 
economy during the period.
As a result of both automatic stabilizers and economic structure, countries with larger government sectors 
tend to have more stable business cycles. The smaller the government sector the more susceptible economies 
will be to spillover effects from foreign business cycles and, as such, to the transmission of economic shocks. 
Moreover, countries with smaller government sectors, and smaller automatic stabilizers, will react less to these 
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shocks. Due to spillover effects and a lack of automatic stabilization, countries with similarly small government 
sectors will be expected to have more similar business cycles and vice versa for countries with large governments. 
The relationship between government sector size, along with discretionary fiscal policy, and business cycle syn‐
chronization is investigated empirically in this paper.
3  | DATA AND METHODS DESCRIPTION
3.1 | Data description
We obtain annual country‐level data from 14 EU countries, namely, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The period of the 
study is 1981–2014. This group of countries are the members of the EU for the full sample period and have, as 
such, followed similar institutional changes in trading relationships and monetary arrangements over the sample 
period, except for the three non‐EMU countries (Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Our choice to use 
annual data is motivated by Degiannakis et al. (2016) who maintain that when dealing with fiscal variables, annual 
data are the most appropriate sampling frequency. The data have been retrieved from AMECO, Datastream and 
IMF direction of trade database.
Unlike many of the papers in this area of research that focus on business cycle synchronization between each 
EU member country and an EU‐wide business cycle, or core country business cycle, we focus on pairwise synchro‐
nization between countries. The 14 countries of our sample generate N(N − 1)/2 unique pairs of synchronization, 
that is, 91. Thus, our sample has 3,094 country‐pair‐years. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level to reduce 
the influence of outliers, leaving 3,063 country‐pair‐years. The actual data series used in this study are shown in 
Table 1.
3.1.1 | Data construction
In this section, we describe how the variables that are used in Equation 3 (see Section 3.2) are constructed from 
the series shown in Table 1.
Dependent variable: Business cycle synchronization measure (BCS)
The cyclical component of GDP is first extracted from the GDP data series. This cyclical component is then used 
to measure the time‐varying level of synchronization between countries i and j. We first extract the cyclical com‐
ponent using the Hodrick–Prescott filter, although other filters were also used for robustness purposes (e.g. Band‐
pass filter),3 they generated qualitatively similar results.
Once the cyclical component of country i's GDP is extracted, the level of its time‐varying synchronization 
relative to country j's cyclical component is estimated using the Diag‐BEKK multivariate GARCH model. Dynamic 
business cycle synchronization (BCSij,t) can be approximated by the time‐varying correlation level between two 
countries’ cyclical components. Recent studies in this strand of the literature have shown that multivariate GARCH 
models, such as the Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner (BEKK) model of Engle and Kroner (1995) are successful in 
capturing the time‐varying synchronization, as this is approximated by the dynamic correlations (see, Degiannakis 
et al., 2014; Degiannakis et al., 2016). Given the low frequency of our data, and the relatively small time period, we 
use a more parsimonious version of the BEKK model, namely the Diagonal BEKK (Diag‐BEKK) model, as used by 
Degiannakis et al. (2014).4
3 For brevity the results are not shown here but they are available upon request.
4 The BEKK model requires (N (N+1) ∕2)+2N2 parameters to be estimated, whereas the Diag‐BEKK only (N (N+1) ∕2).
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The Diag‐BEKK with standard normal distribution is defined as follows
where Yt is a vector containing the business cycles of country i and j, and µt represents their mean values. The εt is the 
innovation process and Zt denotes the bivariate standard normal density function. The conditional covariance matrix 
Ht, is positive definite, whereas matrices A, A', B and B' are diagonal.
The time‐varying correlation (i.e. synchronization) between the business cycles of countries i and j, denoted 
as 휌ij,t, are estimated as follows
(1)
Yt=µt+εt
εt=H
1∕2
t
zt
zt∼N
(
zt;0,I
)
Ht=CC
�
+A휺t−1휺
�
t−1
A
�
+BHt−1B
�
,
TA B L E  1   Variables’ description
Variable's name Acronym Description and Source
Gross domestic product GDP GDP at constant prices of 2000. Obtained from European 
Commission AMECO database.
Cyclically adjusted net 
lending
CANL This is the measure of net lending or net borrowing of central 
government expressed as a % of GDP. Obtained from European 
Commission AMECO database and European Economy.
Government expenditure GEXP Total expenditure of general government expressed as a % of GDP. 
Obtained from European Commission AMECO database and 
European Economy.
Gross exports EXP Gross exports of country i to country j. IMF Direction of Trade 
Statistics obtained from UK Data Service.
Total factor productivity TFP The growth rate of TFP of the total economy. Obtained from 
European Commission AMECO database.
Labour productivity LP The growth rate of the labour share of total factor productivity of 
the total economy. Obtained from European Commission AMECO 
database.
Capital productivity KP The growth rate of the capital share of total factor productivity of 
the total economy. Obtained from European Commission AMECO 
database.
Consumer price index CPI National Consumer Price indices (all items). Obtained from European 
Commission AMECO database.
Size of agricultural sector AGRI Agriculture, forestry and fishing gross value added (GVA) at constant 
prices. Obtained from European Commission AMECO database.
Size of services sector SERV Services gross value added (GVA) at constant prices. Obtained from 
European Commission AMECO database.
Size of industrial sector IND Industry (excluding building and construction) gross value added 
(GVA) at constant prices. Obtained from European Commission 
AMECO database.
Size of construction sector CONS Building and construction gross value added (GVA) at constant 
prices. Obtained from European Commission AMECO database.
Private savings PRSAV Private savings as a percentage of GDP. Obtained from European 
Commission AMECO database and European Economy.
National savings NATSAV National savings as a percentage of GDP. Obtained from European 
Commission AMECO database.
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where hij,t denotes the covariance between the i
th and jth countries’ business cycles and hii,t, hjj, t are the variances of 
the two countries’ business cycles.
The technical details of the Diag‐BEKK model can be found in Degiannakis et al. (2016) and Xekalaki and 
Degiannakis (2010).
3.1.2 | Explanatory variables
The pairwise fiscal policy differentials between countries i and j are captured by the absolute differences in the 
cyclically adjusted net lending (i.e., CANL_DIFFij,t=
|||CANLi,t−CANLj,t|||).
The size of the public sector captures the mix of public and private sector activities in the economy. To capture 
differences in the size of the public sector (PS_DIFFij,t) we use the absolute differences in government expenditure 
as a share of GDP (GEXP), that is, PS_DIFFij,t=
|||GEXPi,t−GEXPj,t|||.5
Furthermore, we use variables that capture differences in the structure of the economy across country‐pairs. 
These include the sectorial specialization measures and the private savings rate.
Differences in sectorial specialization are captured by taking the absolute differences between sectors’ GVA 
as a percentage of GDP of country i and country j, that is, SECT_DIFF(s)
ij,t
=
|||SECT(s)i,t −SECT(s)j,t |||, where s = agri,ind,-
cons,serv for the agricultural, industrial, construction and services sectors respectively.
The private savings ratio (PRSAV) is used to capture the consumer side of the economy and thus differences in 
this ratio are measured as PRSAV_DIFFij,t = \vert PRSAVi,t−PRSAVj,t|.
The bilateral trade intensity variable is calculated as BTIij,t=
(
EXPij,t+EXPji,t
GDPi,t+GDPj,t
)
, where EXPij,t denotes the exports 
from country i to j at time t, EXP
ji,t
 measures the exports from country j to country i at time t, while the denominator 
is the sum of GDP of both country i and country j at time t. Imports are omitted to avoid double counting as ex‐
ports from country i to j are imports of country j from i. 
On the production side, total factor productivity growth rates (TFP), as well as both labour (LP) and capital (KP) 
productivity growth rates are used to capture productivity growth in the economy. Hence, differences in produc‐
tivity are measured as TFP_DIFFij,t=
|||TFPi,t−TFPj,t|||, LP_DIFFij,t= |||LPi,t−LPj,t||| and KP_DIFFij,t= |||KPi,t−KPj,t||| respectively.
Finally, differences in monetary developments across country‐pairs are measured by differences in inflation 
rates, as INFDIFFij,t =
|||log
(
CPIi,t∕CPIi,t−1
)
− log
(
CPIj,t∕CPIj,t−1
)|||.
We should highlight that all differentials are converted into their absolute values so that our results are not 
impacted by the choice of which country enters first or second in the calculations.
3.2 | Method
To test the impact of fiscal policy and government size on business cycle synchronization, we use a dynamic panel 
model. Our specification is specified as follows
where BCSij is the bilateral correlation index of business synchronization between countries i and j, CANL_DIFFij de‐
notes their fiscal policy differentials and PS_DIFFij captures differences in the size of their public sectors. F
′
ij is the 
(2)휌ij,t=BCSij,t=
hij,t√
hii,t
√
hjj,t
,
5 We have also used the absolute differences in government revenues and the results, which are available upon request, are qualitatively similar.
(3)
BCSij,t=a0+b1BCSij,t−i+b2CANL_DIFFij,t−i+b3PS_DIFFij,t−i
+bkF
′
ij,t−i+휇ij+휆t+휈ij,t,
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vector of k potential determinants of business synchronization, which are included in the model as control variables, 
including, bilateral trade, productivity differentials, inflation differentials, sectorial specialization and differences in 
savings rates. We have included as many variables as have been suggested by the existing literature, with the restric‐
tion that data are available for all countries for the full period.
In the model, we control for country‐pair fixed effects (µij) to control for unobservable heterogeneity. λt con‐
trols for idiosyncratic shocks and α0 is the constant. Finally, vij,t represents the error term. β1,2,3 are coefficients 
for the lagged values of BCSij, CANL_DIFFij and PS_DIFFij, respectively, whereas βk is the vector of coefficient esti‐
mates for the k control variables. The key hypothesis tested by this model is to establish if and how discretionary 
fiscal policy and government size jointly determine business cycle synchronization. If discretionary fiscal policy 
responds to idiosyncratic shocks in a manner supportive of business cycle synchronization then a positive coef‐
ficient will be found on this variable. If similarities in government size determine synchronization then a negative 
coefficient will be expected on this variable.
The above dynamic panel model presents a number of econometric issues when used to estimate the matrix 
of potential determinants of business cycle synchronization. First, the OLS estimation method is likely to produce 
biased estimation in the presence of the unobserved country‐specific effects. This can be attributed to the cor‐
relation between the unobserved country‐specific effects and the lagged dependent variable. Although taking 
first‐differences could likely eliminate the country‐specific effects problem, the first‐difference transformation 
will produce a correlation between ΔBCSij,t−1 and Δ휈ij,t through the terms BCSij,t to 휈ij,t, leading to inconsistent OLS 
estimates being produced. Second, the model faces several endogeneity problems given that some of the ex‐
planatory variables are not strictly exogenous. For instance, trade integration and BCS are strictly not exoge‐
nous. Frankel and Rose (1998) contend that countries with similar output patterns and strong trade integration 
are likely to join a currency union, which, in turn, further increases their trade integration and business cycle 
synchronization.
To address the latter issue, we follow Cerqueira and Martins (2009) and employ the system GMM dynamic 
panel estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998), which offers several advantages. First, it 
allows us to draw from the data, a large number of instruments by instrumenting all the exogenous variables 
with their own lagged values as long as they are not correlated with the error term. Second, the system GMM 
addresses any potential endogeneity issues for all variables by estimating the equations jointly in differences 
and in levels. Additionally, it also corrects any additional biases due to the correlation between the fixed specific 
effects and the lagged dependent variable (Cerqueira & Martins, 2009; Guney, Karpuz, & Ozkan, 2017).
In our estimation, we report the findings of the Sargan test of over‐identifying restrictions J as a test for 
instrument validity, although Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2001) report Monte Carlo evidence that this test 
tends to over‐reject, especially when the data are persistent and the number of time‐series observations is large. 
Equation 3 is also estimated for different sub‐periods. Based on the evidence of the AR2 and the Sargan test, we 
adopt different sets of lagged instruments across these different sub‐periods, ranging from t‐2 for the ERM period 
and the common currency period up to t‐6 for the Maastricht treaty period. The differences in Hansen's J‐test 
of overriding restrictions and the AR2 confirm the validity of the instruments. In the dynamic model, we expect 
to have a first‐order serial correlation (i.e. AR1) and no second‐order serial correlation (i.e. AR2). Results of these 
tests are presented in each of the regression output tables.
4  | TIME‐VARYING BIL ATER AL BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONIZ ATIONS
Before we analyse how fiscal policy and the size of the government might play a role in determining the pairwise 
business cycle synchronizations in the EU, it is useful to get a sense of how synchronization levels have fluctuated 
over our sample period. Figure 1 shows the average levels of synchronization, annually, for the period 1981–2014, 
along with their dispersion (i.e. minimum, maximum and standard deviation).
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Our findings suggest that the average pairwise business cycle synchronization levels (across the 91 country‐
pairs) are moderately high, fluctuating between 0.5 and almost 0.8, where 1 indicates perfect synchronization, 
0 indicates no synchronization and a negative value indicates business cycles are moving in different directions 
(i.e. de‐synchronized). Throughout the observation window there are periods of increasing and decreasing levels 
F I G U R E  1   Average, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of all pairwise business cycle 
synchronizations over the 14 countries per year. Sample period 1980–2014. In the top panel, the figure depicts 
the average, minimum and maximum business cycle synchronization level of all 14 countries for each year 
during the sample period 1980–2014. The bottom panel shows the standard deviation of all business cycle 
synchronizations for each year over the sample period
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F I G U R E  2   Average country‐level business cycle synchronizations per year. Sample period 1980–2014. The 
three panels show the core, periphery and non‐EMU countries respectively. AUS = Austria, BEL = Belgium, 
DEN = Denmark, FIN = Finland, FRA = France, GER = Germany, GRE = Greece, IRE = Ireland, ITA = Italy, 
NET = Netherlands, PRT = Portugal, SPA = Spain, SWE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom. The figure presents the 
average country‐level business cycle synchronization vis‐à‐vis all other countries, per year over the sample period
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of synchronization; nevertheless, synchronization levels are on average higher in the latter part of the study pe‐
riod. Although the average value might not reveal the full story and may mask what is happening at an individual 
country level. A closer inspection, focusing on the minimum and maximum values at each time point, shows that 
there are periods when the pairwise synchronizations exhibit higher or lower dispersion. This observation is also 
confirmed from an examination of the standard deviations of the synchronization levels, shown in the lower panel 
of Figure 1.
With respect to the dispersion of synchronization measures, we show that during our sample period, 
there are four reasonably distinct episodes (1980–1993, 1994–2001, 2002–2009 and 2010–2014), which 
correspond with various institutional changes and the European debt crisis. These changes in synchroni‐
zation levels and changes in dispersion, correspond with those found in Degiannakis et al. (2014), where 
they are discussed extensively. The first episode (1980–1993) corresponds with the period of the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM), which was eventually suspended in 1993 following the European currency crisis 
of 1992–1993. This period began with a high average level of synchronization, a low level of dispersion in 
synchronization and positively correlated cycles across all country‐pairs. As the period progressed, syn‐
chronization levels declined, and several country‐pairs were experiencing very high negative correlation 
levels (i.e. de‐synchronization). Moreover, the dispersion of synchronization across country‐pairs increased 
substantially.
The period after the ERM collapse corresponds with the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty and a move 
towards convergence in monetary and fiscal policies in the run up to Monetary Union (i.e. 1994–2001). This period 
seems to have promoted EU business cycle synchronization, which exhibits high average values with materially 
decreasing dispersion across country‐pairs.
The period between the introduction of the common currency and the start of the European Debt 
crisis (2002–2009) is generally associated with increasingly high levels of synchronization between coun‐
try‐pairs. The average measure of synchronization reached a peak in 2009 of around 0.8. This peak in 
F I G U R E  3   Average country business cycle synchronizations over the period 1980–2014. AUS = Austria, 
BEL = Belgium, DEN = Denmark, FIN = Finland, FRA = France, GER = Germany, GRE = Greece, IRE = Ireland, 
ITA = Italy, NET = Netherlands, PRT = Portugal, SPA = Spain, SWE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom. The figure 
presents the average country‐level business cycle synchronization vis‐à‐vis all other countries during the whole 
sample period
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synchronization is due to the impact of the Great Recession, which drove a common cyclical downturn, 
and thus, an increase in synchronization levels. However, even though there was a general increase in syn‐
chronization during this period, this was associated with an increase in the divergence of synchronization 
across countries.
Figure 2, which presents the synchronization measures, by country average, across the full sample period, 
illustrates that this increase in divergence of synchronization across countries, during the 2002–2009 period, 
was primarily driven by lower synchronization levels for the United Kingdom and Greece, and to a lesser 
extent, Portugal. The United Kingdom did not become a member of EMU and the lack of synchronization for 
the Greek economy was well evidenced with the unfolding of the European Debt crisis.
The decoupling effects of the European Debt crisis, during the period 2010–2014, are clearly shown in both 
Figures 1 and 2, where there is a sharp and pronounced decline observed in the average synchronization mea‐
sure. This sharp decline in synchronization is evident across all country‐pairs. Nevertheless, an upward trend is 
noted towards the end of the sample period. It is also noted that this period is associated with an increase in the 
dispersion of synchronization levels across country‐pairs. This increase in dispersion occurs as the synchroniza‐
tion measure falls substantially more in some countries, than in others. This is expected given that during this 
period, countries, such as, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Greece experienced significant declines in their GDP figures, 
whereas this was not observed for other EMU countries, such as, Germany. This might also explain the rather 
interesting finding that Germany exhibits the lowest levels of synchronization among all core EMU members and 
it declines sharply in 2011.
Overall, the dynamics of the synchronization measures over time show evidence of periods of desynchro‐
nization, which are associated with the ERM and the European Debt Crisis periods. The Maastricht period and 
the common currency period are associated with higher and increasing synchronization levels. The dispersion of 
synchronization levels also varies across country‐pairs indicating that not all countries follow the general pattern 
and that different countries experience different business cycle dynamics.
Figure 3 shows the average level of synchronization for each country, vis‐à‐vis all other countries, over the full 
period. It is evident that countries which are not members of EMU (e.g., Denmark and the UK) exhibit among the 
lowest levels of synchronizations over the sample period. This could explain their decision to remain outside the 
EU or perhaps the endogeneity effects of EMU later in the post‐2001 period. Nevertheless, the most interesting 
observation is the fact that Germany and Greece are shown to be the least synchronized EMU countries (this was 
also demonstrated in Figure 2).
It is often argued that EMU is not suited to Greece and the low level of observed cyclical synchronization sup‐
ports this argument. The finding for Germany is contrary to previous studies, such as Degiannakis et al., (2014), 
Degiannakis et al., (2016), which found relatively high levels of synchronization between Germany and a common 
EU business cycle. It is likely that the large weight of Germany in determining EU GDP drove the high levels of 
synchronization when calculated vis‐à‐vis an EU cycle. Here, the size of Germany's economy is not considered, 
and indeed its cycle lacks synchronization in a similar manner to Greece. This may be troubling for the operation 
of EMU policy, as Germany's size allows great influence; however, despite Germany's size, it is not highly influential 
in synchronizing with the cycle of other European countries, provoking the idea that is not only Greece that is not 
suitable for the common currency but Germany also. Ahlborn and Wortmann (2018) also found evidence of a lack 
of synchronization between Germany and other countries’ business cycles. They suggest that France would be 
a better candidate as an exemplar of a core EMU business cycle. France is shown here to have the highest level 
of synchronization with other countries over the period confirming its more appropriate position as a proxy for a 
core European business cycle.
Having briefly examined the patterns of the pairwise synchronization levels over time, it is important to iden‐
tify whether individual fiscal policies and the size of the governments acted as promoters of synchronization, as 
Optical Currency Area (OCA) theory suggests they ought.
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5  | THE DETERMINANTS OF TIME‐VARYING BUSINESS CYCLE 
SYNCHRONIZ ATION
5.1 | Full‐sample estimation
In this section, we present the findings from Equation (3). As aforementioned, in order to establish the effects 
of fiscal policy and government size on the pairwise business cycle synchronization across the sample of 14 EU 
countries, we also consider 10 additional determining factors, which have been included as control variables. The 
data have been analysed for the full sample period 1981–2014.
The results from the full‐sample estimation, shown in Table 2, find that the two fiscal variables are determi‐
nants of business cycle synchronization.6 As theory suggests, differences in the size of the public sector (PS_DIFF) 
across countries exercise a statistically significantly negative effect, whereas statistically significant positive ef‐
fects are evident for the differences in fiscal policy across countries (as captured by CANL_DIFF).
These findings reveal that the greater divergence in public sector size, across country‐pairs, results in lower 
levels of synchronization. In other words, countries with similar sized public sectors have more synchronized 
business cycles, affirming the finding in Camacho et al. (2006). The impact of government sector size on synchro‐
nization is operating through the ‘safety’ and automatic stabilization channels.
The second fiscal variable, cyclically adjusted net lending (CANL), removes the cyclical component and captures 
discretionary changes in fiscal policy stance. Differences in these discretionary policies are found to promote syn‐
chronization, indicating that country‐specific discretionary fiscal policy promotes synchronization. This finding is in 
accordance with OCA theory, which suggests that independent fiscal policies in a monetary union should be used 
to align the business cycles of member countries. As such, an idiosyncratic fiscal policy response, to an idiosyncratic 
economic shock, will ensure that business cycles remain more synchronized across countries. It is noted however, 
that the coefficient on the fiscal variable is only statistically significant in the second specification of the model.
With regard to the control variables, trade intensity and inflation differentials are found to promote cycli‐
cal synchronization, while differences in total factor productivity growth tend to result in less synchronization. 
Sectorial specialization and private savings do not exercise any significant influence on the time‐varying synchro‐
nization measure.
More specifically, this study shows that trade exercises a highly significant effect on business cycle synchroni‐
zation across the country‐pairs. The positive effects of bilateral trade intensity on business cycle synchronization 
confirm a long list of previous studies, which find trade to be important in explaining business cycle synchroniza‐
tion (see for example Gächter et al., 2017). This is expected given that when a country experiences an increase in 
its productivity, this will lead to higher output and income, which, in turn, will lead to higher imports for interme‐
diate goods (productivity effects) as well as finished goods (income effects) from its trading partner. Eventually, 
this should lead to the increase in the trading partner's output and income. Montinari & Stracca (2016) and Imbs 
(2004) also suggest that trade integration is found to foster these spillover effects on countries’ business cycles.
As for the inflation differentials, their positive effects contrast the evidence provided by previous studies, such 
as Camacho et al. (2006), who find no evidence to suggest that monetary variables can explain business cycle syn‐
chronization. Nevertheless, our finding can be explained by two possible channels. First, differences in inflation 
rates across countries indicate that prices and wages are adjusting at different rates. In the New Keynesian model 
of macroeconomic fluctuations, it is the adjustment of wages and prices that allows an economy to move towards 
its trend growth rate following an economic shock. For example, following a positive demand shock, wages and 
prices will adjust upwards moving an economy back towards its trend growth rate. It is shown here that inflation 
6 We have further disaggregated the private savings rate variable into household and corporate savings rates; nevertheless, we did not find evidence 
that these variables exercise any effect on BCS. For robustness purposes we have also estimated the models using only the EMU countries. The 
results are qualitatively similar.
14  |     BUNYAN et Al.
differentials across countries indicate that the adjustment mechanism is operating to promote cyclical synchro‐
nization across countries. Second, inflation differentials across countries provide a mechanism for real exchange 
rate adjustments, and thus may address potential competitiveness gaps among members of a monetary union. The 
real exchange rate adjustments will result in trade balances moving in a direction in support of greater business 
cycle synchronization.
This result is particularly important for the Eurozone countries as inflation differentials are shown to have not 
only a direct effect on monetary policy (i.e. challenging the notion of “one size fits all” monetary policy as being 
suitable across member countries) but also an indirect effect, as inflation differentials are shown to increase 
business cycle synchronization. As such, the findings here show that divergence in inflation rates is expected to 
lead to more synchronized business cycles. Hence, we find here that inflation convergence, which was one of the 
Maastricht criteria for joining the Eurozone, does not contribute positively to business cycle synchronization, but 
rather the reverse holds true.
TA B L E  2   Determinants of BCS, full sample estimations
 
(1) (2)
1981–2014 1981–2014
BCSij,t−1 0.402*** 0.367***
CANL_DIFFij 0.001 0.004**
PS_DIFF
ij
−0.019* −0.012**
TFP_DIFFij −3.946**  
LP_DIFFij  0.573
KP_DIFFij  −6.839***
BTIij 51.091*** 31.370***
INF_DIFFij 3.153* 1.874***
SECT_DIFF
(agri)
ij
0.052 0.011
SECT_DIFF
(ind)
ij
0.015 −0.004
SECT_DIFF
(cons)
ij
0.017 0.005
SECT_DIFF
(serv)
ij
0.002 0.014**
PRSAV_DIFFij −0.010 −0.004
Country fixed effects YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES
Hansen‐J (statistic) 173.50 167.43
Hansen‐J (degrees of freedom) [173] [181]
Hansen‐J (p‐value) 0.471 0.757
Arellano‐Bond test for AR(1) in first difference −6.163*** −6.425***
Arellano‐Bond test for AR(2) in first difference 0.102 0.107
No. of observations 2,972 2,972
Note: Estimates are derived from two‐step system GMM with finite sample correction (Windmeijer, 2005). AR(1) and 
AR(2) are tests of the null hypothesis of no first‐ and second‐order serial correlation respectively. The Hansen‐J is a test 
of the validity of the over‐identifying restrictions based on the efficient two‐step GMM estimator.
Abbreviations: BTI, bilateral trade intensity; CANL_DIFF, differences in the cyclically adjusted net lending; INF_DIFF, in‐
flation rate differentials; KP_DIFF, differences in capital productivity; LP_DIFF, differences in labour productivity; PRSAV_
DIFF, differences in private savings; TFP_DIFF, differences in total factor productivity; PS_DIFF, differences in public 
sector; SECT_DIFF, differences in economic sectors contribution to countries’ i and j GDP.
*,** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
     |  15BUNYAN et Al.
Total factor productivity growth is the final variable found to have a significant impact upon business cycle 
synchronization, indicating that differences in total factor productivity growth reduce business cycle synchroni‐
zation across countries. These results hold true even when we consider only the labour and capital productivity 
growth rates (see specifications 2 of Table 2). Thus, overall, the findings show that it is mainly capital and total 
factor productivity that matters for business cycle synchronization. Previous findings by Camacho et al. (2006) 
also found productivity to be important, but it was labour rather than capital productivity that was shown to 
matter for business cycle synchronization. The fact that total factor productivity and capital productivity play a 
significant role in business cycles synchronization is related to the argument put forward by Kydland and Prescott 
(1982), who argue that TFP is a primary cause of the business cycle.
Finally, we observe that differences in the structure of the economy, as well as in private savings, do not con‐
tribute to the synchronization of business cycles. The finding that differences in sectoral specialization are not 
found to be determinants of business cycle synchronization is contrary to Krugman's (1993) argument that secto‐
rial specialization should lead to the decoupling of business cycles. The theory is that differences in sectoral spe‐
cialization will result in countries being more susceptible to asymmetric shocks and hence less synchronized. This 
is not shown to be the case here. For robustness purposes the estimations have been carried out using national 
savings rather that private savings to capture the savings and consumption side of the economy over the full sam‐
ple period.7 These results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2.
Overall, the evidence from the full‐sample estimations shows that fiscal policy variables can be used to pro‐
mote business cycle synchronization across countries when controlling for other determining factors. It is both 
the size of the government sector as well as discretionary fiscal policy that determines business cycle synchro‐
nization. Hence, greater similarity in the size of the public sector, accompanied by flexible and responsive fiscal 
policy, across EU countries will promote business cycle synchronization and the sustainability of the monetary 
union.
5.2 | Sub‐period analysis
It is rather important to examine whether the full period findings still hold at different sub‐periods, or if differ‐
ences in determinants exist across sub‐periods. Recall that we split our full‐sample period into four sub‐periods, 
which are characterized by important institutional changes in the EU (i.e. 1981–1993, 1994–2001, 2002–2009 and 
2010–2014). The dynamics of business cycle synchronization differed across these time periods, as discussed in 
Section 4 and in previous literature such as Degiannakis et al. (2014). Moreover, Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) 
find that the set of determinants of business cycle synchronization varies across the different phases of European 
integration. These phases of integration are characterized by changes in the institutional framework of the EU 
over time.
Joining European Monetary Union for our sample countries in 2001 could promote greater synchronization 
given the common monetary and exchange rate policy adopted, or it could in fact be a source of macroeconomic 
instability as individual countries can no longer use monetary and exchange rate policy in response to asymmetric 
shocks (Kappler and Sachs, 2013). Entering a monetary union is likely to alter, quite substantially, the behaviour 
of business cycles, not only through the adoption of a common monetary and exchange rate policy but also due 
to increased trade linkages (Frankel & Rose, 1998). However, increased economic integration may cause business 
cycle divergence if that integration promotes specialization in trade, in line with a country's comparative advan‐
tage, ultimately leaving the economy more susceptible to asymmetric shocks (Krugman, 1993).
The results for each of the four sub‐periods are shown in specifications 3–10 in Table 3.8 Specifications 3–6 
include labour and capital productivity individually, whereas specifications 7–10 include the TFP variable. The 
7 The results are available upon request.
8 For robustness purposes, the sub‐period analysis has been also performed for the EMU countries only. The results remain qualitatively similar.
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sub‐period analysis indicates that there is some change in the determinants of synchronization across time, but 
there is also a high degree of consistency in determinants across the sub‐periods.
We start our analysis once again focusing on the key variables of interest, namely, differences in the size of the 
public sector and in fiscal policies.
It is interesting that the results reveal a rather different picture from the full‐sample estimation, which further 
validates our approach to examine the aforementioned effects in a time‐varying approach. Overall, it is clear that 
CANL_DIFF is a statistically significant determinant of the level of synchronization, rather than PS_DIFF. More 
specifically, differences in the size of the public sector seem to matter only during the European debt crisis period, 
whereas fiscal policy is significant for all sub‐periods.
Put simply, these findings suggest that deviations in country‐specific fiscal policy stances tend to promote 
higher synchronization, which is in line with the policy prescription associated with OCA theory. Similar findings 
have also been shown by Degiannakis et al. (2016). In contrast, Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) find that fiscal 
policy differentials have driven differences between countries’ business cycles only prior to the establishment of 
the Stability and Growth Pact. We argue that our framework, where we utilize a robust time‐varying synchroni‐
zation measure, as well as the use of bilateral business cycle synchronizations, allows us to reveal new insights in 
this line of research.
However, the fact that differences in the size of the public sector matter only during the European debt 
crisis period may suggest that during this crisis period, when fiscal policy was more constrained (i.e. by the EMU 
institutional rules, sovereign bond market conditions and fiscal austerity policies), government size can also be 
supportive of increased synchronization.
Turning to the control variables, we note that TFP_DIFF, KP_DIFF, INF_DIFF and BTI maintain their significance 
and direction of effect in all sub‐periods. Once again trade exercises a highly significant effect on business cycle 
synchronization across the sub‐periods, as is also shown in the full‐sample estimation. The consistency in the 
role played by these variables across all sub‐periods adds robustness to the earlier findings that they matter for 
synchronization and that their importance does not change due to institutional changes. This is different to the 
findings of Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) and Kappler and Sachs (2013), who maintain that since the inception 
of the common currency there is a decline in the importance of trade integration on the business cycle synchroni‐
zation among EU members. No such decline is evident here. However, there are differences in some of the other 
control variables across the sub‐periods.
The notable differences in the sub‐period analysis, compared to the full‐sample estimation, are related to the 
effects of differences in the structure of the economy, labour productivity and the role played by private savings.
Focusing on sectoral specialization, it is found that differences in the size of the agricultural sector and the 
construction sector matter for synchronization during the common currency period and also during the Maastricht 
Treaty period. The positive coefficients in the construction and agricultural sectors indicate that differences in 
the size of these sectors across countries promote cyclical synchronization. This is because divergence in sectoral 
specialization across countries can emerge as countries increase their trade volumes and increasingly specialize 
production in the sector in which they enjoy a comparative advantage. This is the rationale for intra‐industry 
trade. The positive coefficient on these sectoral specialization variables is indicative of this process of increasing 
synchronization. This finding runs contrary to Krugman (1993) who predicted that sectoral specialization would 
leave countries susceptible to asymmetric shocks which would lead to business cycle decoupling. It is also note‐
worthy that differences in specialization matter during periods of increasing synchronization across countries 
and increasing integration pre and post the introduction of the common currency, hence sectoral differences can 
promote synchronization during the process of integration.
A related finding with regard to sectoral differences is the role played by private savings during the sub‐pe‐
riods. Private savings is found to be statistically significant during the common currency period. Countries with 
similar savings rates are found to have greater levels of business cycle synchronization. To explain this finding, we 
should note that private savings capture not only the savings rate but also the consumption and the investment 
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sides of the economy. Given that private saving is disposable income minus consumption, and that in equilibrium 
savings equal investment, then differences in savings rates could reflect differences in consumption patterns 
(e.g., lower consumption leading to higher savings rates) or differences in investments rates (e.g., higher savings 
rates leading to higher investments). Our findings reveal that the more aligned the private savings rates (con‐
sumption and investment) between countries, the higher the level of synchronization. Both consumption and 
investment, after all, tend to move in a procyclical manner and are regarded as leading indicators for the business 
cycle (Kharroubi & Kohlscheen, 2017). Such evidence does not offer support to the Backus–Kehoe–Kydland con‐
sumption correlation puzzle (Backus, Kehoe, & Kydland, 1992), which suggests that consumption levels among 
OECD countries are less correlated compared to the output correlations. In essence, this is capturing the structure 
of the economy, which along with the construction and agricultural sectors is found to determine synchronization 
during the common currency period.
Finally, there is evidence that labour productivity and capital productivity are significant during the first three 
sub‐periods. However, the coefficient on the labour productivity variable is positive, indicating that similarity in 
labour productivity growth rates across countries, results in less synchronized business cycles, whereas the oppo‐
site is true for capital productivity growth rates.
6  | CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLIC ATIONS
This study has sought to understand the role played by fiscal variables in the determination of pairwise business 
cycle synchronization across a sample of EU countries. A novelty of the methodological approach applied here is 
to estimate time‐varying pairwise synchronization measures using a multivariate GARCH model, specifically the 
Diagonal BEKK model. Moreover, apart from the fiscal variables, a set of control variables are also included, which 
have been found in the literature to impact upon business cycle synchronization. These include trade intensity, 
productivity, inflation, savings and sectoral specialization. The aim has been to establish if differences in the fiscal 
variables, along with differences in the control variables, are found to impact upon the level of synchronization 
across country‐pairs, which is measured using a time‐varying indicator of synchronization.
Synchronization of business cycles across country‐pairs is shown to increase over the 1981–2014 sample 
period; however, the dispersion of synchronization across country‐pairs shows substantial changes over certain 
sub‐periods. There are periods with a low degree of dispersion of synchronization across country‐pairs, such as 
during the Maastricht period, and periods when the dispersion increased, such as during the recent European 
Debt crisis. These changes in the dispersion of synchronization indicate that even though the overall synchroni‐
zation measures are high and exhibit an increasing pattern, there are periods when decoupling effects are evident 
among countries. We highlight that these changes in business cycle synchronization are themselves associated 
with institutional changes in the process of European integration.
Among the least synchronized business cycles over the sample period are those of the United Kingdom, 
Greece and Germany. With respect to the United Kingdom, this may be assumed to be partly due to the endoge‐
neity effects of their decisions to remain outside of EMU, and partly an indication that their cycles are less suited 
to EMU. The findings for Greece and Germany make it all the more pertinent that policymakers understand the 
determinants of business cycle synchronization in EMU and the potential role that policy variables can play in 
ensuring synchronization is supported.
The main findings of the study show that both the size of the public sector and fiscal policy matter for the 
determination of business cycle synchronization. Countries with similarly sized public sectors and greater fiscal 
divergence have more synchronized business cycles. Hence, convergence in the size of the public sector across 
countries will help to ensure greater business cycle synchronization, presumably through the ‘safety’ and auto‐
matic stabilization channels. As such increased fiscal federalism in EMU will contribute to increased business cycle 
synchronization. As the EU considers the question as to how much fiscal federalism is desirable, the finding here 
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suggests business cycle synchronization ought to feature in this evaluation. Coupled with the aforementioned 
finding is the evidence that that fiscal divergence can also promote business cycle synchronization. Although this 
may seem a contradictory finding, it is in fact evidence that country‐specific fiscal policy has been responsive in a 
divergent manner to stabilize EU business cycles in response to idiosyncratic shocks in a manner that has ensured 
increased synchronization. This is in accordance with how optimal currency area theory suggests that fiscal policy 
ought to respond in a monetary union. From an institutional design perspective, any move to increase fiscal feder‐
alism or constraints that are placed on national fiscal policies, ought to be flexible to the role that can be played by 
fiscal policy in ensuring synchronization. The decoupling of several countries’ business cycles during the European 
debt crisis is indicative of the policy relevance of this finding.
With respect to the control variables, we show that trade intensity, inflation differentials and differences in 
capital productivity growth rates matter for synchronization. Country‐pairs that trade more intensely and have 
similar capital productivity growth rates have more synchronized business cycles, while differences in inflation 
rates across country‐pairs lead to increased business cycle synchronization. Policies to support trade integra‐
tion will increase synchronization, as will policies to ensure similar productivity growth rates across economies. 
Countries with particularly high, or low, productivity growth rates will be at risk of decoupling. Finally, inflation 
differentials are found to be supportive of synchronization and are indicative of differing wage and price dynamics 
across countries as business cycles revert to trend growth rates. This contrasts somewhat with the traditional 
view that inflation convergence is vital in a monetary union to ensure that a single, ‘one size fits all’, monetary 
policy is not a destabilizing force across the currency zone.
Taken together, the findings in this research show that in general economic and institutional convergence is 
supportive of business cycle synchronization, but policy tools and policymakers need to be flexible to divergence 
particularly with regard to fiscal policy.
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